Social Inequalities, Migration and the Rise of Populist Parties

Rising inequalities have been described as a fertile ground for populist parties all over the globe. In this article, we argue that the perception of Inequality alone can strengthen populist attitudes and increase support for populist parties. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, we find that those who perceive greater inequality in society are more likely to support populist parties. To explore the causal relationship, the study also conducts a survey experiment in Denmark, Germany, and Italy, randomly exposing participants to factual information about the wealth distribution. The results show that the perception of inequality can increase populist attitudes, but does not immediate affect the likelihood of voting for populist parties in this context. The findings speak to current debates on how inequality and their perception became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties all over Europe.

Recent scholarship on affective polarization documents partisan animosity in people’s everyday lives. But does partisan dislike go so far as to deny fundamental rights? We study this question through a moral dilemma that gained notoriety during the COVID-19 pandemic: triage decisions on the allocation of intensive medical care. Using a conjoint experiment in five countries we analyze the influence of patients’ partisanship next to commonly discussed factors determining access to intensive medical care. We find that while participants’ choices are consistent with a utilitarian heuristic, revealed partisanship influences decisions across most countries. Supporters of left or right political camps are more likely to withhold support from partisan opponents. Our findings offer comparative evidence on affective polarization in non-political contexts.

Recent studies provide evidence that income inequality is a relevant driver for the electoral success of populist parties all over Europe. In this article, we aim to understand how exactly increasing income inequality can lead to support for populist parties. More specifically, we discuss four different attitudinal mechanisms from previous research: economic insecurities, trust in political elites, social integration, and national identity. We rely on eight waves of the European Social Survey and find that economic insecurities, trust in political elites, and national identity are linked to rising income inequality and populist support as expected. However, a causal mediation analysis shows that these mechanisms are not sufficient to fully understand the impact of income inequality on support for populists. This finding raises questions regarding the empirical support of existing theories to explain how macroeconomic changes in inequality became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties.

Public opinion polarisation can impair society’s ability to reach a democratic consensus in different political issue areas. This appears particularly true when the polarisation of opinions coincides with clearly identifiable social groups. The literature on public opinion polarisation has mostly focussed on the US two-party context. We lack concepts and measures that can be adapted to European countries with multi-party systems and multi-layered group identities. This article proposes a conceptualisation of polarisation between groups in society. It presents a measure that captures the overlap of ideology distributions between groups. The two-step empirical framework includes hierarchical IRT models and a measure for dissimilarity of distributions. The second part presents an empirical application of the measure based on survey data from Switzerland (1994–2016), which reveals insightful dynamics of public opinion polarisation between party supporters and education groups.

The free movement of people is a fundamental principle of the European Union (EU) that has led to an increase in EU-internal migration. This study investigates the impact of increased immigration to Germany resulting from the 2004 and 2007 eastern enlargement of the EU on concerns about immigration within the German population. By merging 20 years of annual migration statistics with panel data on individual attitudes and exploiting exogenous variation in the gradual enlargement of the free movement policy, we examine the causal effects of EU-internal migration on immigration concerns. Our findings suggest that the influx of immigrants from new member states did not have a clear average effect on concerns about immigration, but increased concerns among German natives with materialist-survival values. The study provides insights into the societal division caused by opposition to immigration as part of the European integration process.